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abstract
Multiple-vote majority rule is a procedure for making group decisions in which
individuals weight their votes on issues in accordance with how competent they
are on them. When individuals are motivated by the truth and know their relative
competence on different issues, multiple-vote majority rule performs nearly as well,
epistemically speaking, as rule by an expert oligarchy, but is still acceptable from
the point of view of equal participation in the political process.
1. introduction
A voting rule is a system for producing group decisions or judgements on propositions or
proposals as a function of how the individuals making up the group vote on these prop-
ositions or proposals. Different voting systems display quite different virtues: epistemic
ones, such as the ability to produce the correct decision or to avoid very bad ones; pro-
cedural ones such as ensuring equal participation in decision making, safeguarding indi-
vidual rights and recognising individual autonomy; and practical ones, such as
exibility or ease of implementation. The paper will focus on just two of these desiderata:
the propensity of the rule to produce correct decisions and the extent to which it ensures
equality of participation. Not because they exhaust the relevant characteristics of a voting
rule, but because they enable us to display in a precise way the trade-off between the goal
of involving in decisions as many as possible of the people that are affected by them and
the goal of reliable and prompt decision-making.
The trade-off is somewhat obscured by over-optimistic interpretations of the Condorcet
Jury Theorem that, by focusing on cases in which voters are large in number and at least
minimally competent, suggest that democratic forms of decision-making deliver the best of
both worlds. The core of the epistemic defence of democracy is the claim that, in giving all
an equal say, majority voting delivers group decisions that reliably track the truth; indeed
more reliably than dictatorial or oligarchical ones. However in cases in which voters are
modest in number, and the competence of individual voters varies to a large degree from
voter to voter and issue to issue, voting systems that give unequal weight to those that are
more competent will produce better decisions, an epistemic benet that is purchased at the
cost of unequal participation.
In this paper we evaluate a rule that we dub multiple-vote majority rule (MVMR) and
argue that, under suitable considerations, it achieves a better balance of epistemic
reliability and equality of participation than several other well-known rules, including
majority rule. The rule of multiple-vote majority rule works as follows. Suppose that
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the group must make a decision on a number of propositions, say ten in all. Then each
individual is allocated ten votes which they can place on any of the propositions. That
is, they can vote up to ten times on a single proposition as long the total number of
votes they cast does not exceed ten (i.e. the individual abstains from voting on the remain-
ing nine propositions). The collective decision is reached by adding up the number of votes
for and against the proposition and accepting it if and only if the number for exceeds the
number against. If individuals are only interested in the truth, they will try and place their
votes where they will do the most good, i.e. will have the greatest positive impact on the
group competence. For instance, if they consider themselves more competent on two of the
propositions than on the others, they could concentrate their votes on them. Our conjec-
ture is that when competence varies both between individuals and between propositions,
and individuals have second-order competence on the question as to what they are com-
petent on, then multiple-vote majority rule can produce greater group competence than
majority rule without sacricing equality of participation.
Our discussion works within a framework inherited from well-known epistemic
defences of democracy (see for instance Cohen 1986; Estlund 1997). Its essential constitu-
ents are as follows. A group of individuals hold diverse judgements on one or more prop-
ositions, but must reach a collective decision as to whether to accept or reject each one of
them. Each proposition can be true or false and each individual’s judgement on each prop-
osition is assumed to be reliable to some degree, this being measured by the conditional
probability that they will vote for the proposition, given that it is true. Each individual’s
acceptance of the proposition is signalled by a vote for the proposition, rejection by a vote
against.
A voting rule is a proposition-independent procedure for determining collective accep-
tance or rejection of any proposition on the basis of how the individuals vote and any rel-
evant characteristics of the individual voters. The only characteristic we consider is the
individuals’ competence on the propositions on which they vote. A rule that ignores these
characteristics and determines the social acceptance or rejection of the propositions solely
on the basis of the pattern of votes will be called an anonymous rule. Anonymity is desirable
from a procedural point of view because it encodes equality of participation. On the other
hand, what we are interested in, from an epistemic point of view, is the capacity of voting
rules to arrive at the correct verdict, i.e. to accept propositions when they are true and reject
themwhen theyarenot.Whether a rule is goodatdoing this depends, of course, onhowcom-
petent individuals are, but also on how the rule exploits this competence.
More formally, we dene the reliability of a particular voting rule to be a function from
a prole of individuals’ reliabilities to the corresponding group reliability, this being the
conditional probability that the rule in question will lead to acceptance of the proposition,
given that it is true. The tendency of a rule to produce the correct outcome may then be
dened as the expected value of its reliability, relative to some probability measure over
proles of individual reliabilities.
To study the reliability of various voting rules, we look at three cases. First we look at a
baseline case in which individuals are assumed to have the same reliability as each other
and on every proposition. This case has been already been studied elsewhere (by List
2008, for instance) and we will simply rehearse existing results. In the second treatment,
we drop the assumption of homogeneous reliability amongst individuals and allow that
the reliability of individuals is heterogeneous. In the third treatment, we also drop the
assumption of homogeneous reliability across propositions.
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Throughout we will make a number of important assumptions. First, we assume that
individuals are only interested in the truth and so they vote for a proposition only if they
believe it to be true, or more likely than not to be true. When individuals vote for other
reasons – for instance, because a proposition being collectively accepted benets them
in some way – then many of the conclusions we draw here will have to be modied.
Multiple-vote majority rule remains a rule of interest in these circumstances because it
offers a way of allowing individuals to express preference intensities by placing more
votes on propositions that they feel strongly about. But we put aside this discussion here.
Secondly, we assume that individuals’ votes are independent of one another in the sense
that the probability that any voter will accept or reject any proposition is independent of
whether other voters do. Although unrealistic, this assumption is often made in the litera-
ture on epistemic democracy and we adopt it here partly for reasons of simplicity and
partly to facilitate comparisons with existing results. We do not think that the main con-
clusions of the paper would be substantially affected by dropping it.
Thirdly, we assume that individuals’ votes on each of propositions in the given set are
independent in the sense that the probability that an individual will accept any proposition
in the set is independent of whether she accepts or rejects any other. This assumption will
not generally be satised in real voting situations as the logical independence of prop-
ositions does not by any means ensure their probabilistic independence. We adopt it for
the same reason as the previous independence assumption, namely simplicity and ease
of comparison with existing results. And in this case too we do not think that the main
conclusions of the paper will be much changed by a more realistic treatment.
Finally, we assume that voters know their own relative reliability on propositions, but
have little knowledge of the reliability of others. Whether this assumption holds is, of
course, a contingent matter. There is some evidence of a correlation between actual com-
petence and self-perception of competence in a number of domains,1 but it’s clearly unrea-
listic to suppose that in general individuals have very precise knowledge of this kind. But
although we use precise values for relative reliability in the model of voting with hetero-
geneous reliability (see appendix), the argument does not require that agents’ know these
precise values. What it does require is that they can make qualitative comparisons between
their reliability on different propositions, so that they can shift votes away from the issues
on which they are less reliable and towards those on which they are more condent of
their judgemental abilities.
2. homogeneous reliability
Suppose that a group of n individuals must decide on whether each member of a set of ve
propositions, J = {P1, . . ., P5}, is true or not. Let the positive reliability rj
i of individual i on
the jth proposition be dened as the probability that i will vote for proposition Pj, given
1 See for instance Kruger and Dunning (2009). They show that for issues of logic and humor (though not
grammar), while the top percentiles tended to under-estimate their ability and the bottom percentiles
tended to over-estimate their abilities, there is nevertheless a strong relationship between the actual abil-
ity of agents and their perceived ability. Extrapolating from this result, if agents are more competent on
some questions than on others, they should be able to detect this difference. As a consequence they
should be able to allocate more of their votes to the questions they feel most competent on, at the
expense of those questions they feel the least competent on.
a (mainly epistemic) case for multiple-vote majority rule
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that the proposition is true. The negative reliability r̄j
i of i on Pj is the probability that i will
vote against Pj, given that Pj is false. The competence of i on Pj, denoted by cj
i, is measured
by the ratio of the probability that they will vote for Pj, given that it is true, to the prob-
ability that they will vote for it, given that it is false, i.e.:
cij =
rij
1− rij
In virtue of the assumption that individuals’ votes on the propositions are probabilis-
tically independent, the positive reliability of individual i on the whole set of propositions
(or equivalently their conjunction), r0
i , will equal Πj=1
5 rj
i. (We won’t study negative
reliabilities on sets of propositions, but it is simple enough to see how the treatment of
positive reliabilities extends to them.)
The group’s reliability respectively on proposition j and on the whole set of prop-
ositions will be denoted by rj
G and r0
G. These group reliabilities depend on the voting
rule employed to determine acceptance of any of the propositions. Group acceptance of
the set of propositions can however be determined in two ways: by applying the voting
rule to each proposition in the set and then accepting the whole set only if every one of
its members is accepted (the premise-based procedure) or by applying the voting pro-
cedure to the set itself, or more exactly, the conjunction of its members (the conclusion-
based procedure). These two procedures will not generally produce the same result, as
we show below.
In our rst treatment we assume homogeneous competence in the group and on all ve
propositions in virtue of identical positive and negative reliabilities. Let the uniform posi-
tive reliability of individuals be r, so that the individuals’ common reliability on the set of
propositions equals r5, and that of the group be rG. A number of different voting rules can
now be compared in terms the values of rj
G and r0
G that they yield, as well as the prob-
ability of the group reaching a correct verdict on all ve propositions.
1. Dictatorship: On this procedure the group accepts a proposition if and only if some
individual – the dictator – votes for it. Group reliability in this case just equals that
of the dictator. Given the assumption of homogeneous competence on propositions
this means that rj
G = r and r0
G = r5.
2. Unanimity rule: On this rule, the group accepts a proposition j if and only if, every indi-
vidual in the group votes for j. Given the assumption of independence, group reliability
is the product of individual competencies. Hence with homogeneous reliability:
rGj = rn
rG0 = r5n
3. Majority rule: The group accepts a proposition if and only if a majority of individuals
in the group vote for it. Given independence and homogeneous reliability this means
that:
rGj =
∑
h.n2
n
h
( )
rh(1− r)n−h (1)
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If a premise-based procedure is employed to determine group acceptance or rejection of the
set of propositions, then independence anduniform reliabilityonpropositions implies that:
rG0 = (rGj )5
On the other hand, under a conclusion-based procedure, these assumptions imply that2:
rG0 =
∑
h.n2
n
h
( )
r5h(1− r5)n−h (2)
How then do these rules compare in terms of the group reliability they induce? Tables 1
and 2 display the probabilities, for each of the rules, of delivering the correct verdict on a
single proposition (SP) and on the whole set of them (MP), for a range of values for posi-
tive reliability r and population size n. In the case of majority rule, the tables give group
reliabilities under both the premise- and conclusion-based procedures (MP(P) and MP(C)
respectively). (All values in Tables 1–6 are rounded.)
No voting rule performs better epistemically than all others for every level of individual
reliability. Consider rst the single proposition case. If r > 0.5, then the Unanimity rule is
beaten by Dictatorship which is beaten by Majority rule (once adjustments for ties have
been made). If r < 0.5, then the Unanimity rule is beaten by Majority rule which is beaten
by Dictatorship. The reason for this is the law of large numbers, the mechanism under-
lying the Condorcet Jury Theorem: as the population size rises, the probability that the
proportion of individuals voting for a true proposition P will equal the population’s
reliability on P tends to one. Hence if r is greater than one-half, majority rule will accept
true propositions with high probability. On the other hand, if r is less than one-half, then
majority rule will lead with very high probability to rejection of true propositions.
Table 1. Homogeneous reliability, r = 0.49Ă
n Dictator Unanimity rule Majority rule
5 SP 0.49 2.82 × 10−2 0.48
MP(P) 2.82 × 10−2 1.80 × 10−8 2.58 × 10−2
MP(C ) – – 2.16 × 10−4
15 SP 0.49 2.25 × 10−5 0.47
MP(P) 2.82 × 10−2 5.82 × 10−24 2.29 × 10−2
MP(C ) – – 0
105 SP 0.49 2.96 × 10−33 0.42
MP(P) 2.82 × 10−2 2.25 × 10−163 1.31 × 10−2
MP(C ) – – 0
1005 SP 0.49 4.44 × 10−312 0.26
MP(P) 2.82 × 10−2 1.72 × 10−1557 1.18 × 10−3
MP(C ) – – 0
10005 SP 0.49 2.58 × 10−3100 0.02
MP(P) 2.82 × 10−2 1.15 × 10−15498 6.46 × 10−9
MP(C ) – – 0
2 The reliability of an individual on the conclusion (which is a conjunction of different premises) will be
no higher, and typically much lower, than her reliability on any of the premises. For convenience we
assume that the reliability of the conjunction of h independent propositions is (rj
i)h.
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Defenders of majority rule claim that the former case is to be expected as even poorly
informed individuals are likely to be better than purely random devices in picking true
propositions. But this argument cannot be right in general, as the case of multiple prop-
ositions shows. If individuals have a reliability of, say, 0.51 on each of the ve prop-
ositions, then their reliability on the conjunction of them is 0.515 = 3.4503 × 10−2.
Hence, in accordance with the predictions of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, as the number
of voters increases the probability of a correct majority verdict tends towards zero. This
explains the poor epistemic performance of conclusion-based majority rule. For this
reason, we dispense with conclusion-based voting for the remainder of the paper and
focus on premise-based voting, whereby the conclusion is accepted by the group iff
each of premises is accepted by a majority.
In both cases of reliability above and below a half the Unanimity rule will accept true
propositions with only extremely low probability. (On the other hand, it will also accept
false propositions with low probability, so Unanimity rule will be a good rule when the
consequences of accepting a false proposition are disastrous.)
3. heterogeneous reliability
In this section we drop the assumption that the reliabilities of individuals are the same and
allow for heterogeneity in the population. Voting rules will again be compared in terms of
the group reliability they induce both on single propositions and on a set of them. In this
richer setting moreover we can meaningfully look at new rules which exploit reliability
heterogeneity by putting decisions in the hands of the more or most reliable.
There are two salient categories of such rule: ‘oligarchic’ rules which use only the votes
of the most reliable and ‘weighting’ rules which weight votes according to reliability and
accept a proposition only if the weighted sum of votes for it exceeds some threshold. The
formercategory includes expertdictatorship, inwhich thedecision ismadebyadictatordrawn
from themost reliable group; expert unanimity rule, whereby a group accepts a proposition iff
Table 2. Homogeneous reliability, r = 0.51Ă
n Dictator Unanimity rule Majority rule
5 SP 0.51 3.45 × 10−2 0.52
MP(P) 3.45 × 10−2 4.89 × 10−8 3.76 × 10−2
MP(C ) – – 3.90 × 10−4
15 SP 0.51 4.12 × 10−5 0.53
MP(P) 3.45 × 10−2 1.17 × 10−22 4.21 × 10−2
MP(C ) – – 0
105 SP 0.51 1.97 × 10−31 0.58
MP(P) 3.45 × 10−2 2.98 × 10−154 6.56 × 10−2
MP(C ) – – 0
1005 SP 0.51 1.28 × 10−294 0.74
MP(P) 3.45 × 10−2 3.45 × 10−1470 0.22
MP(C ) – – 0
10005 SP 0.51 1.74 × 10−2926 0.98
MP(P) 3.45 × 10−2 1.58 × 10−14629 0.89
MP(C ) – – 0
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it is accepted by all members of the most reliable group; and expert majority rule, whereby a
proposition is accepted if it is accepted by a majority of members of the most reliable sub-
group. As the epistemic performance of these types of rules has already been compared and
unanimity rules shown to produce poor group positive reliability, we will conne attention
to expert dictatorship and expert majority rule.
There are as many variants of the second category as there are ways of placing weights
and xing thresholds. Given the independence assumptions made here and on the assump-
tion that the utility of true and false positives and negatives are symmetrical, it is known
that the optimal weights to use are the competencies of the individuals, or for mathemat-
ical convenience, the logs of these competencies, with the threshold being simply the point
at which the weighted sum of votes for a proposition exceeds those against (see Grofman
et al. 1983; Ben-Yashar and Nitzan 1997; Dietrich 2006).
In the very simple implementation that we explore here, we assume that individuals’
positive reliabilities rj
i are identical to their negative reliabilities rj
−i, so that cj
i = rj
i /(1− rji),
and that there is a (roughly) normal distribution of competence in the population
which we then approximate by dividing the population into ve ‘reliability-pentiles’ of
individuals of the same reliability, with the reliability of each pentile being determined
by the parameters of the background normal distribution. The important observation
to make is that this modelling is intentionally crude. Any distribution of reliabilities in
a group is sufcient for our result provided that it is heterogeneous (to allow for the
exploitation of epistemic differences between individuals) and symmetric about the
mean (so that the Condorcet Jury Theorem results hold3). The aim is to bring out
Table 3. Heterogeneous reliability, r′ = 0.49Ă
n Expert Dictator Majority Rule Expert MR. Weighted MR.
5 SP 0.86 0.48 0.86 0.92
MP 0.46 2.51 × 10−2 0.46 0.65
SP 0.86 0.47 0.94 0.99
15 MP 0.46 2.12 × 10−2 0.75 0.96
SP 0.86 0.40 1 1
105 MP 0.46 1.06 × 10−2 1 1
1005 SP 0.86 0.23 1 1
MP 0.46 5.82 × 10−4 1 1
10005 SP 0.86 0.01 1 1
MP 0.46 6.41 × 10−11 1 1
3 Theorem V in Grofman et al. (1983) states that if the distribution of competencies is symmetric then we
obtain results analogous to the classic Condorcet Jury Theorem by substituting average reliability for
homogeneous reliability. What is precisely meant by a symmetric distribution and by analogous results
is unclear. We were unable to nd a published proof of the full Condorcet Jury Theorem for hetero-
geneous reliabilities. Owen et al. (1989) shows that the asymptotic Condorcet Jury Theorem, which
states that in the limit the probability of a correct majority verdict tends towards certainty, holds for
heterogeneous reliabilities irrespective of their distribution. It therefore seems plausible that the non-
asymptotic Condorcet Jury Theorem, which states that the probability of a correct majority verdict is
monotonically increasing with group size, also applies to cases with heterogeneous reliabilities. That
the results of a homogeneous and heterogeneous group are analogous (and not identical) seems impor-
tant. Some groups of voters may have identical average reliabilities but different group reliabilities
a (mainly epistemic) case for multiple-vote majority rule
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important characteristics of voting rules in populations with heterogeneous competence,
rather than to realistically describe actual distributions of competence (which anyway
will vary from issue to issue, population to population). We assume that the roughly nor-
mal distribution of reliability is identical across all propositions, so an individual with low
reliability on the rst proposition will have identically low reliability on the remaining
propositions. Similarly a different individual with high reliability on the rst proposition
will have identically high reliability on the remaining propositions.
Let the reliability of individuals in the ith reliability-pentile be ri, with r* being the
upper bound of the reliabilities, and r′ representing the average reliability of agents in
the group. Then these assumptions imply:
1. Expert dictatorship: rj
G = r*.
2. Majority rule: As before the group accepts a proposition if and only if a majority of
individuals in the group vote for it. Now, however, individual reliability varies, so
group reliability on any proposition is given by4:
rGj =
∑
S,N: S| |.n2
∏
i[S
rij
∏
iS
(1− rij) (3)
3. Expert majority rule: The group accepts a proposition only if the majority of the k
most competent individuals of the group vote for it. Given the assumption of
Table 4. Heterogeneous reliability, r′ = 0.51Ă
n Expert Dictator Majority Rule Expert MR. Weighted MR.
5 SP 0.88 0.52 0.88 0.92
MP 0.51 0.04 0.51 0.65
15 SP 0.99 0.88 0.54 0.96
MP 0.96 0.51 0.04 0.80
105 SP 0.88 0.60 1 1
MP 0.51 0.08 1 1
1005 SP 0.88 0.77 1 1
MP 0.51 0.28 1 1
10005 SP 0.88 0.99 1 1
MP 0.51 0.96 1 1
depending on the distribution of reliabilities, as the following example shows:
(riJ,r
j
J,r
k
J ) = (0.6, 0.6, 0.6), r′ = 0.6, rGJ = 0.648
(riJ,r
j
J,r
k
J ) = (0.3, 0.6, 0.9), r′ = 0.6, rGJ = 0.666
The monotonicity of the non-asymptotic Condorcet Jury Theorem holds for groups with heterogeneous
reliabilities provided two conditions hold: rstly, that we retain current group members as group size
increases; and secondly that the average reliability remains constant as group size increases. The rst
of these conditions is an institutional design feature we can choose to employ. By the law of large num-
bers, the second condition becomes increasingly likely as group size increases.
4 See Owen et al. (1989). According to Grofman et.al. 1983: Theorem V the probability of a correct
majority winner given a symmetric distribution of competencies can be approximated with the follow-
ing formula:
rGj =
∑
h.n2
n
h
( )
r´h(1− r´)n−h
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homogeneous reliability within pentiles this means that:
rGj =
∑
h.k2
k
h
( )
r∗h(1− r∗)k−h (4)
4. Competence weighted majority rule: The group accepts a proposition only if the
weighted sum of votes for it exceeds the weighted sum against, with the weight on
the vote of any individual voter i being given by ln(ci). This means that:
SGj =
∑
S,N:
∏
i[S
rij
∏
i[S
(1− rij)
where the sum is taken over all sets S , N such that
∑
i[S In(ci) .
∑
iS In(ci)5
We have assumed that the reliability of individuals does not vary by proposition and
that the probability that they vote on any premise proposition is independent of whether
they vote on they others. Hence application of a premise-based procedure in combination
with any of four rules gives:
rG0 = (rGj )5
We display in Tables 3 and 4 the group competencies induced by these rules on single
and multiple propositions for a range of values for mean positive reliability r and popu-
lation size n.
These studies show that there can be signicant epistemic advantages, for a range of
populations sizes, to be gained from concentrating decision-making powers in the
hands of a subset of the population. As noted earlier, Condorcet’s Jury Theorem shows
that if reliability is greater than a half then as the number of voters tends towards innity,
simple majority rule will generate a group reliability of certainty. But what happens at the
limit is less interesting than the reliabilities for realistic group sizes. The results above show
that where the average reliability of voters is greater than a half and group size ranges
between 5 and 10,000 then both expert majority rule and weighted majority rule are
vastly epistemically superior to simple majority rule. In fact group size need only
be around 100 for these aggregation functions to generate group reliability close to
certainty.
Equally signicant are the results for when average individual reliability is less than a
half. In this case, under majority rule group reliability worsens as group size increases. In
contrast under both expert majority rule and weighted majority rule group reliability
increases with group size. In fact, once again a group size of approximately 100 voters
is sufcient for these aggregation functions to generate group reliability close to certainty.
The mechanism behind this result is simple enough. The ability to ignore the least compe-
tent group members (in the case of expert majority rule) or discount the least competent
(in the case of weighted majority rule) is epistemically virtuous, albeit at the cost of equal-
ity of participation. The explanation for the slight epistemic superiority of weighted
5 Adapted from Owen (1989).
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majority rule over expert majority rule is that in the former the judgements of the least
competent voters are not simply ignored, but treated as negative indicators. For example
if a particularly incompetent voter votes ‘false’ on a proposition, the mechanism of
weighted majority rule might assign one or more votes in favour of it.
Although rules exploiting competence heterogeneity have epistemic advantages, the
implementation of them can be highly problematic. How is it to be determined, for instance,
who are the most competent? Societies do of course have mechanisms for settling this ques-
tion in different domains: educational qualications and experience being perhaps the two
important routes to becoming a recognised expert in a eld. Decentralisation of judgements
to experts in these ways is not generally perceived to be contrary to democratic principles of
equal participation, primarily because these judgements are inputs to the political system,
not outputs. When public health policy is under political review, for instance, expert advice
will normally be sought from health care experts, but this advice is not automatically trans-
lated into policy. Rather it is weighed up by voters or, more typically, their representatives,
and synthesised with other kinds of judgements (regarding policy goals, resources, etc.)
before a policy is decided upon. When expert judgement plays this role it is more appropri-
ately regarded as part of the deliberative process that precedes voting, than as a feature of the
aggregation process itself.
It is in the policy arena that the problem of implementation is most acute. Rule by an
expert oligarchy would clearly be at the expense of the ideal of equal participation in the
political process. One possible way around this problem is to settle the question of who
are the most competent by aggregation of individual opinion. In this domain, as in all
others, some rules will fare better than others in some conditions, and worse under others.
In particular, if individuals are minimally competent at judging the competence of others
on a particular proposition, then majority rule will fare well as a means for picking the
most competent to decide on the truth of P. In general if individuals are better at judging
competence on P than at judging P itself, then (practical considerations aside) there will be
benet attached to using majority rule to settle the question of who should play the role of
expert in the implementation of an expert majority rule verdict on P. Furthermore, doing
so will allow for equal, indirect participation in decision-making, since all will have any
equal say in whose opinion is to carry the most weight in deciding on P.
Whether it is plausible that individuals have such second-order reliability with regard to
other agents will depend on the issue at hand. At the end of the paper, we will give an argu-
ment for why it should not be assumed that individuals do generally have such knowledge.
For the moment the important point to note is that once we allow for heterogeneity in indi-
vidual reliabilities with regard to these second-order judgements about rst-order reliability,
then the argument in favour of weighted majority, and against simple majority rule, will
apply again. And this in turn will raise then problem of equality of participation in decisions
about whose judgements should carry much weight. Turning to a third-order aggregation of
individual judgements about second-order individual judgements about rst-order ones is
not only impracticable, but threatens an innite regress. In other words, once there is hetero-
geneity ‘all the way up’, we seem to be stuck with a conict between the epistemic virtue of
high group reliability and the procedural virtue of equal participation.
The elephant in the room in this discussion is however the fact that reliability is not
uniform across propositions, so any procedure for settling who are the relevant experts
will need to be of a general purpose kind that can be routinely employed whenever
decisions have to be made. The enormous practical difculties associated with organising
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a vote to determine the assignment of reliabilities to individuals every time a decision
needs to be made on an issue, more or less rules this out as such a general purpose scheme.
On the other hand if reliability was transparent, having reliability weights set by a com-
mittee would be a practical way of dealing with the problem. The problem is that in con-
ditions of anything less than complete transparency, this system is very open to abuse and
is likely to lack legitimacy. It would be better if such knowledge about relative reliability
could be used by the individuals themselves. It is this possibility that we now consider.
4. proposition-relative reliability
In our nal treatment we consider a model in which individuals have varying degrees of
reliability on different propositions and know what these reliabilities are. We will not
assume that individuals know each other’s reliabilities. When reliability varies from prop-
osition to proposition a second dimension of gains from specialisation opens up, namely
those that derive from individuals specialising on propositions that they are most reliable
to judge. Once again there are various possible implementations of this idea including
allowing individuals to vote only on those propositions for which their reliability is
above some threshold and then have the group accept propositions iff either all or a
majority of those that qualify to vote, do in fact vote for it. But these rules too are unsa-
tisfactory in virtue of the fact that they disenfranchise individuals to some degree.
Instead we suggest that allowing individuals to decide whether or not to vote, or where
to concentrate their votes, offers a way of realising the gains from specialisation without
contravening the principle of equal participation. Individuals themselves must be trusted
to decide whether or not, or to what degree, their casting a vote on some issue is truth-
conducive in the sense of improving group reliability. The simplest way of doing this
would be to allow individuals to refrain from voting on any issue for which their reliability
is below some threshold – 0.5 for instance. A more sophisticated treatment would allow
individuals to attach more votes to those propositions on which they are most reliable. The
rule we study here, which we dubbed multiple-vote majority rule, does just this.
Under multiple-vote majority rule, every voter is allocated the same number of votes, pro-
portional to the number of propositions on which collective judgement must be reached.
Individuals can then place as many of these votes as they wish on each proposition provided
that the total votes cast does not exceed the number allocated. A proposition is collectively
Table 5. Propositional-relative reliability, r′ = 0.49Ă
n Expert MR Weighted MR MVMR -i. MVMR -ii
5 SP 0.86 0.92 0.78 0.86
MP 0.46 0.65 0.28 0.46
15 SP 0.94 0.99 0.86 0.95
MP 0.75 0.96 0.48 0.79
105 SP 1 1 1 1
MP 1 1 1 1
1005 SP 1 1 1 1
MP 1 1 1 1
10005 SP 1 1 1 1
MP 1 1 1 1
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accepted if and only if the number of votes for it exceeds the number against. In our simple
model for the implementation of this rule, we assume that the distribution of reliability for
each proposition is exactly as it was in the previous case, with the average reliability of voters
being the same across all ve propositions. However the identity of the voters at each
reliability level varies between propositions. We can then compare the following rules
under this treatment in terms of the group reliability that they yield.
1. Expert majority rule: Given our simplifying assumptions, group reliability on both a
single proposition and on the set of them is the same as the previous case.
2. Competence weighted majority rule: The group accepts a proposition if and only if the
weighted sum of votes for it exceeds the weighted sum against, with the weight on the
vote of any individual voter i being given by ln(cj
i), as in the previous case. Hence group
reliabilityonboth a single proposition andon the set of them is the sameas the previous case.
3. Multiple-vote majority rule: The group accepts a proposition if the majority of votes
are in its favour. Given our simplifying assumptions this means that group reliability
on any proposition will depend on individual reliability in exactly the same way as
it does for majority rule. The reliabilities themselves will be different, however, since
the majority will contain more votes from competent individuals. The consequences
of employing multiple-vote majority rule depend on how individuals choose to distri-
bute their votes over propositions. We consider two rules:
i. Relative reliability: Individuals assign to the jth proposition the percentage of their
votes equal to:
rij∑5
j=1 r
i
j
ii. Relative competence: Let Ji* # J be the set of all propositions with respect to which
individual i has a competence greater than one (i.e. on which i is at least minimally
competent). Then for all Pj[ Ji*, cj*
i > 1 individuals assign to the Pj[ Ji* the pro-
portion of their votes equal to:
ln (cij)∑
j[Ji∗ ln (c
i
j)
Table 6. Propositional-relative reliability, r′ = 0.51Ă
n Expert MR Weighted MR MVMR -i. MVMR -ii
5 SP 0.88 0.92 0.81 0.87
MP 0.51 0.65 0.34 0.51
15 SP 0.96 0.99 0.90 0.97
MP 0.80 0.96 0.58 0.84
105 SP 1 1 1 1
MP 1 1 1 1
1005 SP 1 1 1 1
MP 1 1 1 1
10005 SP 1 1 1 1
MP 1 1 1 1
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How then do these rules compare in terms of the group reliability they induce? In
Tables 5 and 6 are displayed the probabilities for each of the rules of delivering the correct
verdict on a single proposition and on the whole set of them, for a range of values for
mean positive reliability r and population size n.
All three voting systems perform well for the chosen parameters, with weighted
majority rule doing slightly better than the other three. In a sense weighted majority
rule represents the upper limit in terms of group reliability that can be achieved given
that reliability is tied to agents, and we cannot shift the signals among agents. As long
as there is at least one agent such that their reliability is not equal to 0.5 (that their
reliability is either strictly greater than or strictly less than 0.5), then weighted majority
rule will always deliver a social choice that is likely to be correct.
What is most striking about these results is the fact that the multiple-vote majority rule,
in both versions, does very well in terms of epistemic performance. In fact for group sizes
from 105 up, multiple-vote majority rule performs as well epistemically as both expert
majority rule and weighted majority rule and slightly better than the former. But at the
same time, multiple-vote majority rule preserves the important procedural rule of equal
participation (while expert and weighted majority rule don’t). This gives support to the
claim that multiple-vote majority rule achieves an optimal balance between epistemic per-
formance and respect for equality.
It is worth considering the difference between the relative reliability versus relative com-
petence treatment of multiple-vote majority rule. The relative competence treatment has a
slight epistemic advantage over the relative reliability treatment. The relative reliability
treatment involves agents concentrating their votes on those propositions that they are
most competent on. They will still be able to cast all of their votes, even if their compe-
tence is below a half. By contrast, the relative competence treatment involves agents ignor-
ing all those propositions in which their reliability is below a half (i.e. their competence is
less than one) and then concentrating their votes on the propositions on which they are
most competent. As such, if it were the case that an agent did not have a competence
greater than one on any proposition then they would decide (for the good of the group
competence) to abstain from casting any votes. Relative competence multiple-vote
majority rule does not preserve the procedural rule of equal participation. This problem
did not arise in the sample calculations above as it was assumed that each agent had at
least one proposition on which they were minimally competent.
The epistemic success of all these rules derives from two factors. First from removing
low reliability voters from a vote on a given proposition and, secondly, from giving
extra weight to the votes of high reliability voters.6 The net effect of the two factors is
to raise the average reliability of each vote cast for a proposition. But the way these factors
are put to work is different in the various rules. In the case of multiple-vote majority rule
they work by individuals choosing to abstain from an issue or to place additional votes on
it. In the case of weighted majority it is by individuals’ votes being (involuntarily) dis-
counted or inated by the procedure itself. This virtue of multiple-vote majority rule,
namely that it lets individuals make the choices, is also a potential weakness. For when
individuals misjudge their relative reliabilities on issues, the rule will result in false prop-
ositions being accepted with a higher probability than, say, majority rule. But it does not
6 See Theorems II and XIII of Grofman, Owen and Feld (1983).
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seem plausible on evolutionary grounds that this kind of misjudgement could be the norm.
Nor is there good reason to believe that there are reliable alternative ways of weighting
individuals’ votes.
5. concluding remarks
The claim of this paper has been that, under the assumed conditions of truth-motivated
independent voters with some knowledge of their own relative competence on different
propositions, multiple-vote majority rule achieves a better balance of epistemic perform-
ance and equality of participation under conditions of heterogeneous competence than
several well-studied rules, including majority rule and weighted majority rule. To con-
clude, we consider an interesting objection to this claim. The objection is that the three
assumptions – that agents’ know their own relative competencies, that they are motivated
only by the desire to reach the truth and that they do not know the relative competencies
of others – are in tension with one another. For if individuals were really so motivated,
they would inform each of their relative competencies and agree to a voting rule which
exploited this (now common) knowledge of differences in competence amongst individ-
uals. In particular they would agree to use of weighted majority rule, because this rule
is epistemically optimal in conditions of heterogeneous competence.
There are two things to be said about this objection. First, when there is common
knowledge of both the judgements each individual makes on the various propositions
under consideration and their competence on these propositions, then something close
to a consensus can be expected to form without need for voting of any kind. For individ-
uals will adjust their own judgements on these propositions in the light of the information
they receive about other’s judgements.7 For instance, if you truthfully report that you
believe that it will rain tomorrow and that your competence on this question is very
high, then I, truth-seeker that I am and in the knowledge of my own lower competence
on matters meteorological, will defer to your judgement to some (and probably large)
degree. But if this is right, then the issue of what voting rule to use doesn’t arise (because
any unanimity-preserving one will do). We only need to vote on questions when there are
limits to what we know, including about the extent of what others know.
Secondly, the objection assumes that individuals have a very rich information about
their own competencies, much richer than we think is normally justied. It is one thing
to assume that individuals can make essentially ordinal comparisons of their abilities on
different domains and quite another to suppose that they can make essentially cardinal
interpersonal comparisons of ability. In order to implement multiple-vote majority rule,
it sufces that individuals can make ordinal comparisons of ability and use these compari-
sons to place more votes where they are more competent. On the other hand to implement
weighted majority rule we need cardinal and interpersonally comparable information
about individuals’ competencies, because we need to be able to say to what degree one
person is more reliable than another. And although it is true that under the assumed con-
ditions individuals should communicate what they know, if all they know is how compe-
tent they are on one issue relative to another, all this sharing of information will not result
7 See Bradley (2006) for a detailed examination of this claim.
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in a situation of common knowledge of how competent individuals are relative to each
other. Hence it cannot be expected that a consensus on what weights to assign votes
will form.
6. computational appendix
Here we set out some of the basic details of how the sample calculations in this paper were
undertaken. Group competence for majority rule, expert majority rule, weighted majority
rule and multiple-vote majority rule were calculated using a model in the Mathematica
program. Given the limits of computing power and time, the model employed a Monte
Carlo simulation in which votes were pseudo-randomly drawn from a pool, with the
expected value of the draw identical to the value of the reliability.
For groups with heterogeneous reliabilities we assumed that the distribution of
reliabilities in our group of voters corresponded roughly to a truncated normal distri-
bution. To contrast cases in which the reliability assumption of the Condorcet Jury
Theorem was not fullled we chose two different means: μ = 0.49 and μ = 0.51. For ease
of calculation we split this distribution of reliabilities into ve discrete pentiles, as
shown in the table.
On a given proposition a fth of group 1 would then have a reliability of 0.1248, a
further fth of group 1 would have a reliability of 0.2791, and so on. For a given individ-
ual in group 1 there will be one proposition on which they would have a reliability of
0.1248, a further proposition on which they would have a reliability of 0.2791, and so on.
Under the voting rule of multiple-vote majority rule (MVMR), voters decide for them-
selves on what propositions to cast their votes. We investigated two rules for how individ-
uals choose to distribute their votes over propositions, namely relative reliability and
relative competence. Given the specic assumptions of reliabilities, these rules generate
the attribution of ve votes as shown in the table.
Ă
Group 1 (μ = 0.49) Group 2 (μ = 0.51)
1st pentile 0.1248 0.1448
2nd pentile 0.2791 0.2991
3rd pentile 0.4900 0.5100
4th pentile 0.7009 0.7209
5th pentile 0.8552 0.8752
Ă
Group 1 (μ = 0.49)
0.1248 0.2791 0.4900 0.7009 0.8552
Votes under majority rule 1 1 1 1 1
Relative reliability MVMR 0 1 1 1 2
Relative competence MVMR 0 0 0 2 3
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Although these allocations of votes come from very specic calculations, the very same
allocations could be obtained by voters using much simpler heuristics to decide where to
place their votes. For example, if voters were aware that there was one proposition on
which they were least reliable and one proposition on which they were most reliable,
they could improve their epistemic contribution to the group by abstaining on the former
proposition and casting an extra vote for the latter.
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